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Introduction
Uno¢ cial production of goods and services is a big deal an activity engaged in by mil-
lions of rms employing hundreds of millions of workers and producing trillions of dollars
of output internationally.1 The lions share of research on the determinants of the scale
of the uno¢ cial economy investigates cross-national patterns among aggregate economic
and institutional variables. The micro political-economic mechanisms by which institutions,
policies and related factors inuence the productive behavior of rms are much less well doc-
umented and understood, though empirical studies based on national aggregates sometimes
draw inferences about the micro processes that might underlie the macro political-economic
relationships uncovered.2
This article focuses explicitly on the productive activity of private rms, which compared
to individuals are relatively una¤ected by moral sentiments by the guilt and shame individ-
uals may feel when evading taxation and failing to comply with other legal obligations. We
propose a micro-level model specifying how institutional benets, taxation and government
regulations rationally inuence a prot-maximizing rms production choices. Unlike models
that have rms making all or nothingchoices about producing o¢ cially or uno¢ cially,3 a
central prediction of the model is that prot-maximizing rms frequently will operate si-
multaneously in both production modes. Moreover, contrary to a traditional view that high
tax rates are intrinsically a major cause of large shadow economies, the model implies that
the incentive of rms to produce underground and evade taxation depends on statutory tax
rates relative to rm-specic, rationally calibrated thresholds of tax toleration. The concept
of rm-specic tax toleration helps explain why tax compliance and uno¢ cial production
1Uno¢ cial economic activity is dened here as production and sale of goods and services that evade o¢ cial
registration and taxation. Such activity is undertaken either by rms that are not registered o¢ cially, or by
rms that are registered o¢ cially but produce and sell at least part of their output uno¢ cially. Common
labels used in place of uno¢ cialare hidden, parallel, underground, shadow, informal, black, and unobserved.
Schneider, and Enste 2002 provides detailed discussion of various denitions of the concept and estimates of
aggregate national magnitudes.
2Loayza 1996, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 1997, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998,
Friedman et al. 2000 are important examples of research investigating model-derived relationships among
government policies, institutions and the underground economy with empirical data for country aggregates.
Johnson et al. 2000 investigates similar empirical relationships in rm-level data for ve East European
transition countries without reference to an explicit model.
3In Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 1997, for example, the quality of institutions and governance drive
rms into an activity equilibrium allowing only one of two stable states: totally o¢ cial and totally uno¢ cial.
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vary so greatly across enterprises operating in the same national political-institutional envi-
ronment and facing the same government regulations and tax rates.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The production setting of prot maximizing
rms that optimally allocate labor and capital to o¢ cial production, uno¢ cial production,
or both is dened in the next section. O¢ cial production is subject to taxes and regulations,
but it benets from government supplied and coordinated institutional services unavailable
to underground operations. Uno¢ cial production on the other hand escapes regulations and
taxation of prots and labor, but it requires rms to bribe enforcement authorities who aim
to maximize their own income from public employment and bribes, subject to the likelihood
of being discovered selling corruption and su¤ering the penalties associated therewith. In this
setting the circumstances under which a rm will undertake at least some of its production
underground and evade taxes are derived. A central condition underlying uno¢ cial produc-
tion and tax evasion is that statutory tax rates exceed rm-specic thresholds of tax toler-
ation. Toleration thresholds are determined, among other things, by government-supplied
institutional benets available only to o¢ cial production and by political-institutional vari-
ables a¤ecting the costs of corruption required to produce uno¢ cially. At the end of this
section some implications of the model for the responses of a rms o¢ cial, uno¢ cial and
total output to changes in tax rates and changes in tax toleration induced by shifts in outside
policy variables a¤ecting the demand for and supply of corruption are illustrated graphically.
The models predications concerning the determinants of rmstax toleration and tax
compliance are tested empirically in the third section by ordered logit regression analyses
based on interview data obtained from managers of 3686 enterprises distributed over 55
countries by the World Banks World Business Environment Surveys (WBES 2000). Both
structural and reduced form regression equations yield broad support of the models testable
implications. Observations about the policy implications of the theory and evidence are
developed in the nal section.
The Setting
Consider private rms endowed with xed stocks of capitalK and variable labor requirements
in two non-exclusive modes of potential production: o¢ cial production yielding declared
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output yo that is subject to taxation, and uno¢ cial production yielding undeclared output
yu that evades taxation. Lo denotes labor employed o¢ cially and Lu denotes labor employed
uno¢ cially. Assume that wage rates w are the same for all workers but that an employers
labor cost in o¢ cial activity is (1 + tw) w, where the labor tax rate tw subsumes the formal
payroll tax rate tL and regulations on o¢ cially employed labor RL that impose costs that
are functionally equivalent to conventional labor taxes.4 k denotes the fraction of its capital
that the rm allocates to o¢ cial production and (1  k) is the fraction allocated to uno¢ cial
production.5 A rms total output ytotal is the sum of its o¢ cial output yo and its uno¢ cial
output yu. ytotal may be comprised of separate production chains operating independently
at di¤erent locales in o¢ cial yo and/or uno¢ cial yu mode, or by parallel operation of the
two modes at one venue.
yo production is represented by the following Cobb-Douglas type (constant returns to
scale) technology:
yo = B

 
kK

Lo ; +  +  = 1; ; ;  > 0. (1)
B denotes the productive value of institutional services available only to o¢ cial activity,6
such as contract enforcement and protection of property by police and judicial authorities,
customs and export subsidies and services, and o¢ cial banking services.7 It excludes public
4We could allow the wage rate w to vary between a rms o¢ cial and uno¢ cial operations, wo and wu,
but so doing would not change the models implications so long as wage costs (as opposed to wage rates)
remained higher in o¢ cial production a condition which is achieved in the present setup by the payroll tax
factor (1 + tw).
5Hence the model abstracts from capital accumulation and each rms allocation of its capital endowment
K reveals its disposition to engage in o¢ cial and uno¢ cial production.
6For simplicity we assume there are no user costsattached to B; providing for them would add little to
the formal analysis.
7It is easy to think of concrete examples of institutional services tied to o¢ cial production and its inputs
(the o¢ cial part of total production), even among rms simultaneously engaged in o¢ cial and uno¢ cial
activity using a mix of o¢ cial and uno¢ cial inputs in tandem at one venue to produce a homogeneous
stock of goods or services ytotal, which consequently is partly o¢ cial and governed by yo technology and
partly uno¢ cial and governed by yu technology. Here are a few: Smaller scale construction companies are
known to undertake some jobs uno¢ cially and others o¢ cially, perhaps unbeknownst to their customers.
Payment disputes in the industry are commonplace, yet builders cannot seek judicial relief for money owed
for uno¢ cial jobs and cannot appeal to police or courts when materials are stolen from black construction
sites or are stolen by workers employed black in otherwise white projects both being common problems in
the industry. Manufacturers producing for export cannot take advantage of government export subsidies and
payment insurance schemes if the volumes involved are suspiciously large relative to o¢ cially declared, taxed
labor inputs and output. Restaurants and independent hotels are known to employ some sta¤ o¢ cially and
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goods like a nations communication and transport infrastructures and public health and
education systems that benet both o¢ cial and uno¢ cial producers and their employees as
well as other aspects of institutional capacity that do not directly a¤ect productive e¢ ciency.
The productive contribution of B will generally depend both on rm-specic attributes for
example, size, area of activity, complexity of legal organization, managerial sophistication8 
and on the country-specic availability of institutional services of given quality. Hence even
among rms with high need of institutional services owing to their characteristics, inputs of
B may be low because of generic deciencies of national capacity.
Production of uno¢ cial, untaxed output yu can take no benet of government institu-
tional services. In principal yu and yo denote goods and services of the same kind and quality.
However in order to employ capital and labor underground and avoid conscation of uno¢ -
cial output by omniscient bureaucrats, rms pursuing uno¢ cial operations must engage in
corrupt transactions with enforcement o¢ cials tax authorities, health and safety inspec-
tion agents, construction site inspectors, and so forth.9 Inputs of bureaucratic corruption
are therefore necessary for a rm to produce and market uno¢ cial output. The quantity
of those inputs is denoted by units of C. Uno¢ cial production technology has the same
parameters and functional form as o¢ cial technology:
yu = C

 
(1  k)K Lu. (2)
others uno¢ cially (cleaning and maintenance personnel for example) with an eye to hiding from taxation
corresponding shares of revenues. Use of standard banking services for wage payments or recourse to law
enforcement agencies in cases of alleged theft and other forms of employee malfeasance are problematic
for workers engaged uno¢ cially. The same problems face enterprises supplying home services gardening,
cleaning, pool maintenance and the like.
8The assumption that rms di¤er with respect to their need for and e¤ective use of institutional services
is consistent with some existing rm-level empirical evidence. For example, in their analysis of enterprises
in transition economies Johnson, McMillan, and Woodru¤ 2002 found that court enforcement of contracts
is more important to rms establishing new business relationships than to established rms, and is more
important to industries with a relatively low specicity of investments. Data presented in Batra, Kaufmann
, and Stone 2003 indicate that small rms by comparison to medium and large rms are less constrained by
customs procedures, whereas small- and medium-sized rms are more constrained than large ones by access
to o¢ cial banking institutions.
9The productive activity we model is not criminal in the sense that it would be legal if undertaken
in the o¢ cial, taxed economy. In other words, we are not dealing with activities generally treated as
criminally illegal (and frequently controlled by criminal organizations), such as the drug trade, smuggling
and prostitution .
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By contrast to some previous studies that view corruption and bribery as forces driving rms
out of o¢ cial production into the underground economy,10 equation (2) is based on the idea
that the grabbing handsof corrupt bureaucrats serve as helping handsallowing rms to
exploit protable opportunities by producing uno¢ cially.
A prot maximizing rm needs to decide how much labor to employ o¢ cially and un-
o¢ cially,11 how to distribute its capital stock between the two production modes, and how
much corruption to buy from corruptible bureaucrats.12 Firms are price takers and output
prices are normalized to 1 so that revenue is coterminous with output. The rm maximizes
net revenue  by solving the problem
max
k;Lo;Lu;C
 = (1  t) [yo   (1 + tw)wLo] + [yu   wLu  mC]
s:t: 0  k  1; C;Lo; Lu  0; and eqs: (1)  (2)
(3)
where m denotes the unit price of C, and the tax rate t subsumes the formal prot tax rate
tF and regulatory burdens on o¢ cial activity RF that are analogous to taxes.
The Bureaucrats Problem
In any given jurisdiction corruption is supplied monopolistically by a representative pub-
lic o¢ cial (a bureaucrat) who is responsible for enforcing the tax code and other regulations.
The enforcement bureaucrat is assumed able to accurately detect a rms uno¢ cial activity
but is willing to overlook it if compensated su¢ ciently by illegal payments.13 The bureau-
10See for example Choi, and Thum 2005, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 1997 and Friedman et al. 2000.
11Firms are assumed to be able to allocate labor freely between o¢ cial and uno¢ cial activity. Treating
labor as a passive resource is of course an abstraction from the real world in which workers as well as rms
face incentives and disincentives to participate in the underground economy. The seminal economic analysis
of tax compliance among utility maximizing individuals is Alingham , and Sandmo 1972. Sandmo 2005
reviews developments in this tradition over the generation following the original 1972 paper.
12Firms producing o¢ cially may also pay bribes to obtain or to speed up delivery of B from recalcitrant
government authorities. (See Shleifer , and Vishny 1993.) And both o¢ cial and uno¢ cial producers may
engage maa-type organizations to obtain criminally (and, indeed, sometimes more e¤ectively) such o¢ cial
services as contract enforcement. No attempt to model such complications and attention is conned to the
bureaucratic corruption and bribery necessary for a rm to produce in the underground economy. Incorpo-
rating bribery to o¢ cial activity would lead to results dependent upon relative corruption in the two sectors,
without qualitatively a¤ecting our conclusions. The path-breaking study of Peru by De Soto 1989 found
that bribe payments by uno¢ cial businesses vastly exceeded those made by o¢ cial businesses.
13The setup below draws on the pioneering paper of Becker, and Stigler 1974 and the subsequent more
complex model of Mookherjee, and Png 1995 which is oriented to rms that pay bribes in order to evade
pollution regulations. Models composed of the interplay of three constituents  an outside exposure or
monitoring mechanism, and buyers and sellers of corruption owe much to Klitgaard 1988. The seminal
work launching modern political-economic analysis of corruption more generally is Rose-Ackerman 1978.
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crat receives a salary equal to S. If involved in corrupt transactions and not caught, the
bureaucrat enjoys additional income from bribes equal to m  C. If discovered to be selling
corruption, the bureaucrat loses employment and pays a xed penalty P . The bureaucrats
expected income E (yb) then is:
E (yb) =  (S +mC)  (1  )P (4)
where (1  ) is the probability that the bureaucrat is discovered to be selling C:
The probability  is determined by an exogenous (un-modelled) mechanism exposing
corruption
 = e C ;  > 0. (5)
At any given C;  determines the e¤ectiveness of exposure procedures which will tend to
vary with rm-specic characteristics a¤ecting the visibility of transactions in the corruption
market.14 Note that
@
@C
=  e C < 0, so that the more units of corruption sold by the
bureaucrat, the higher the chances (1  ) of being caught and penalized. However if the
exposure mechanism is weak ( is small), the probability of being caught tends to be small,
even when C is large.15
The bureaucrats problem is to set a price m per unit of corruption that maximizes
expected income (4), subject to (5) and the rms demand for corruption. The optimal
solution to the bureaucrats problem yields the supply relation16
m =
 (S + P )
1  C . (6)
Equation (6) implies that enforcement bureaucrats will supply corruption and overlook tax
evasion only if rms will pay a unit pricem higher than a minimum dened bym =  (S + P ).
The minimum acceptable price m rises as the bureaucrats salary S increases, as the mech-
14The most important characteristics a¤ecting visibility and hence the magnitude of  are likely to be
aspects of rm size for example, the magnitudes of the rms capital stock K and its labor force L.
15If the exposure likelihood of corrupt transactions were a¤ected, say negatively, by their aggregate nation-
wide incidence (C), then multiple equilibria may arise of the sort studied by Andvig, and Moene 1990 and
Nabin, and Bose 2008. We make no attempt to analyze such complexities here.
16Proofs of all results asserted in this article are given in an Appendix of Proofs available at www.douglas-
hibbs.com.
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anism for exposing corruption becomes more e¤ective (as  increases), and as punishment
becomes more stringent (as P increases). In other words, the higher are , S, and P , the
more costly it is to induce bureaucrats to supply corruption. And the greater is the demand
for corruption, the higher is the unit price of C acceptable to bureaucrats at given risks of
exposure and punishment. Equation (6) also implies that a nite positive equilibrium price
for corruption can exist only when C <
1

, reinforcing the point that the less e¤ective are
procedures for detecting corruption, the less constrained is its supply from the bureaucracy
and the higher is the likelihood that a market for corruption will exist.17
Along with institutional services B directly a¤ecting productivity of o¢ cial activity,
national realizations of ; S and P comprise important aspects of a countrys broader insti-
tutional capacity. If that broader national capacity were introduced explicitly and indexed
by B; then B; ; S and P would be constituent components. B and f; S; Pg are treated
as structurally distinct even though they generally will be correlated positively by virtue
of an underlying common national determinant B left outside the models formal setup to
economize on notation.18 Indeed there is some gain in so doing because focusing on com-
ponents of B like B and f; S; Pg allows theoretical analysis later in this section of specic
proximate demand- and supply-side determinants of uno¢ cial activity and tax evasion, and
at the same time it does not detract from the empirical analyses reported in section 3.
Uno¢ cial Production and the Existence of Corruption Markets
Assume that the rm has perfect information about the bureaucrats supply schedule in
(6). For given positive values B, t, tw, , S, and P , the rms maximization program in
17Complicit rms are not punished in the same fashion as enforcement authorities discovered selling cor-
ruption because prot from uno¢ cial production in (3) is not a¤ected directly by the exposure probability
(1  ). Instead exposure e¤ectiveness depresses prot via the positive e¤ect of  on the price of corruption
m. Modifying the structure of penalties and costs falling on bureaucrats and rms yields analytical results
qualitatively similar to those derived for the present model, though some plausible variations complicate
enormously the comparative statics.
18Illustrated graphically:
B
+
%
&
+
B
+! yo
l+ l 
f; S; Pg !
+
m !  yu
where single-headed arrows indicate structural-causal relations and double-headed arrows represent non-
causal correlations. Hence the broader underlying institutional capacity B exerts direct positive causal e¤ect
on o¢ cial production yo via B and negative causal e¤ect on uno¢ cial production yu via f; S; Pg0 s positive
e¤ect on corruption prices m; as shown ahead in the main text by equations (7) and (8)
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(3) admits two solutions: (1) an interior solution where the rm allocates capital and labor
to both o¢ cial and uno¢ cial production, and (2) a corner solution where labor and capital
are allocated wholly to o¢ cial production. In the rst case the rm enters into corrupt
transactions with bureaucrats in order to protect its uno¢ cial output, whereas in the second
the rm has no incentive to evade taxes and produce uno¢ cially, and thus has no need of
C.19 The two cases are now considered sequentially.
When the rm nds it optimal to produce in both modes simultaneously (k < 1), the
prot maximizing levels of output are:
yo =

Bm


(1  t)

1
1 + tw


(7)
yu =


m
 



w
 

(1  k)K (8)
where the share of capital allocated to o¢ cial production is k =
(1 t)+ B( 11+tw )


( m)
+
 K( w)


. Intuitively,
equations (7)-(8) can be interpreted as saying that the rm decides how much output to
produce in each mode by rst determining the maximum output it could produce uno¢ cially
where it avoids taxes on prots and labor. Setting k = 0 on the right-side of (8) gives notional
maximum uno¢ cial output as ymaxu =


m
 



w
 

K. The rm then implicitly trades o¤
part of ymaxu for taxable output yo up to the point where institutional benets to o¢ cial
production compensate the rm for the tax liabilities incurred by producing o¢ cially. It
follows that the rm will nd it protable to operate to some degree uno¢ cially (k < 1 and
yu > 0) only if 

m
+



w
 

K > (1  t)+

1
1 + tw


B. (9)
For a given capital stock K, condition (9) indicates that the rm engages in tax evasion
19The third hypothetical possibility in which the rm operates wholly in the uno¢ cial sector emerges only
in the fanciful case of conscatory taxation (t = 1) or, more realistically, when o¢ cial institutional services
are either not needed by the rm or are not provided to any meaningful extent by government (B = 0). Small
operations delivering personal services (often single-person rms) probably are the most common example
of cases in which the productive value of B is practically zero. The WBES 2000 data used for empirical
testing in section 3 were obtained from rms legally registered and, therefore, not engaged exclusively in
uno¢ cial production.
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when cheap corruption and relatively low wage costs a¤ecting uno¢ cial activity combine
with high tax rates on prots and labor and decient institutional services a¤ecting o¢ cial
activity.
Recall from the analysis of the bureaucrats problem that a positive supply of corruption
requires m to be above the minimum price m =  (S + P ). The rm, on the other hand,
needs to pay bribes to purchase C only if it produces uno¢ cially (yu > 0), which by (9)
requires that
m < 

K
B
 
+


w
 
(+)
(1  t)  (1 + tw)

(+) . (10)
The right-side of (10) therefore denes the upper bound of Cs unit price, which will be
denoted m: Corrupt transactions between rms and bureaucrats will exist only if m < m,
that is, only if
 (S + P ) < 

K
B
 
+


w
 
(+)
(1  t)  (1 + tw)

(+) . (11)
When (11) holds, rms and enforcement bureaucrats will agree on a unique price for units
of C and an active corruption market enabling uno¢ cial production will exist.
The rms demand for corruption, implied by the rst order condition for C in (3), is
C =


m
+



w
 

(1  k)K (12)
where recall that k is a positive function of B; m and w and a negative function of t; tw and
K (see eq. 8). Figure 1 uses sensible values for terms in the corruption supply and demand
functions (eqs. 6 and 12) to show that a unique equilibrium (m; C) exists in the admissible
range (m; m).20
20A more formal demonstration runs as follows. The optimal relation (6) implies the supply function
CS (m) = m (S+P )m : Eq. (12) gives demand as C
D (m) =
 

m
+



w
 

(1  k)K. As illustrated in Figure
1, at CS (m) = 0, CS (m) < CD (m), and at CD (m) = 0, CD (m) < CS (m). Since CS (m) is monotonically
increasing in m and CD (m) is monotonically decreasing in m, it follows that there exists a unique value
m in the interval (m; m) such that CS (m) = CD (m). Therefore, when the maximum unit price a rm
is willing to pay for C is higher than the minimum unit price the bureaucrat is willing to accept, they will
always nd a price m they can agree upon. When condition (11) does not hold, then m > m and the rm
will not purchase corruption required to produce uno¢ cially and evade taxes. Consequently, there will be
no transactions for C and an active corruption market will not exist. The conventional price-quantity axes
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Figure 1: Prices and Quantities in the Corruption Market. When a rm is willing to
pay a price per unit of C exceeding the minimum price m acceptable to enforcement bureaucrats,
an active market for corruption will exist with equilibrium (m; C).
Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance
In addition to dening conditions for the existence of a corruption market, eq. (11) has
important implications for the impact of prot taxation on tax compliance and the uno¢ cial
economic activity. Solving (11) for the prot tax rate on the left-side shows that uno¢ cial
production emerges when
t > t
t  1 


 (S + P )
 
 
K
B
 
+


w
 
(+)
(1 + tw)

+ .
(13)
t may interpreted as the rms threshold of tax toleration. What matters for a rms optimal
production strategy is not the absolute rate of prot taxation, but instead the magnitude of
t relative to the rate a rm perceives to be worth payingin light of institutional benets
available only to o¢ cial activity and the cost of corruption required to produce uno¢ cially.
In terms of variables amenable to policy inuence, (13) says that tax toleration increases
with rm-specic institutional benets B and corruption pricesm, where the latter are deter-
in Figure 1 are interchanged because the forgoing argument is somewhat easier to interpret from the graph
lines when C is on vertical axis and m on the horizontal.
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mined by rm-specic e¤ectiveness of corruption exposure  and nation-specic bureaucratic
salaries plus penalties S + P . On the other hand, toleration of taxation falls as the relative
price of labor deployed in o¢ cial production (1 + tw) rises.
When the prot tax rate facing a rm is below its toleration threshold, the value of
tax evasion in the underground economy is outweighed by a combination of the cost of
corruption necessary to produce uno¢ cially, and protable opportunities in taxable activity
where production benets from government supplied institutional services. Consequently
when t  t, uno¢ cial production and corruption are nil, and rms comply fully with the
tax code. Formally, this case represents a corner solution to the rms problem in (3) with
k = 1; yu = 0 and C = 0. Total output (ytotal) at the corner is
yo = B

+K

+


(1 + tw)w
 
+
= ytotal. (14)
An implication of the equilibrium results is that it is possible for government to impose
high rates of prot tax without triggering large diversions of resources to underground pro-
duction and large scale tax evasion if political authorities are able to raise B, , S and P
enough to create even higher thresholds of tax toleration for most rms. This connection of
tax compliance and tax toleration among rms in the model is comparable to the concept of
scal exchangebetween citizens and government developed in studies of tax compliance
among individuals. High tax compliance and positive perceptions of scal exchange arise
when taxpayers regard the tax system as fair and responsive to citizen preferences, nancing
government programs delivering personal benets and public goods citizens approve of.(See,
for example, Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1993, Cummings et al. 2005, Feld, and Frey 2007,
Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey 1994, Pommerehne, and Weck-Hannemann 1996, Roberts, and
Hite 1994, and Schloz, and Lubell 1998.) Yet the correspondence is far from perfect. As
mentioned earlier, rms inherently are less susceptible than individuals to behavioral pres-
sure from moral sentiments. The anguish of bad conscience may weigh upon individuals;
rational calculations of the bottom line drives the rm.
Figure 2 depicts the pattern of a representative rms production choices as the prot
tax rate t varies around a xed threshold of tax toleration t. The constituents of t (the
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prot tax rate proper tF , and regulations on o¢ cial producers RF ) are of course core policy
instruments in any national political economy. Total output in Figure 2 cumulates the rms
o¢ cial and uno¢ cial production.
t
—
1
t
y
ytotal
yo
yu
Figure 2: Optimal Output Levels as the Prot Tax Rate Varies. O¢ cial output yo
decreases and uno¢ cial output yu increases monotonically as the tax rate t rises above a rms tax
toleration threshold t. Consequently the o¢ cial output share yo=(yo+ yu) decreases, but the rms
total output ytotal = (yo+ yu) may expand or contract, depending on the initial condition of t: At
t < t all production is o¢ cial, and at t = 1 all production is uno¢ cial.
In the graph region where t < t (to the left of t on the horizontal axis) all of a rms
production is o¢ cial; ytotal = yo. As t rises above the threshold t, rms begin to nd uno¢ cial
activity protable and they produce yo and yu simultaneously. The response of production
decisions to increases of the prot tax rate among rms perceiving t > t and, consequently,
already evading taxes to some degree, is composed of direct and indirect e¤ects. Tax rate
hikes directly depress marginal returns on labor and capital in o¢ cial production, which
by itself prompts rms to shift resources to uno¢ cial activity  k falls and yu rises (eq.
8). Higher underground production, however, requires bigger inputs of corruption, and the
associated upward shift in demand for C prompts an upward adjustment of the price m (eq.
6) in the corruption market which mutes the increase in uno¢ cial activity ultimately induced
by a higher t (eqs. 7-8).21 Nonetheless, in the range t > t, higher tax rates unambiguously
21In other words the impact of tax rate changes on a rms output decisions would be stronger, and the
equilibrium level of corruption would be higher, in the absence of interactions in the corruption market
between rms and bureaucrats over the price of C that prompt bureaucrats to adjust m in response to shifts
in the demand for corruption.
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lead to equilibrium increases of yu and decreases of yo and, therefore, to decreases in the
share of o¢ cial output in a rms total production.22
The e¤ect of changes to prot tax rates on a rms total output, ytotal = yo+yu, depends
on ts initial condition. As suggested by Figure 2, in the range t >> t an increase in t induces
a decline in o¢ cial output that more than o¤sets the corresponding rise of uno¢ cial output,
thereby contracting the rms aggregate production.23 The reason is that when prot tax
rates are relatively high, rms tend to be heavily engaged in uno¢ cial production and to be
paying high prices for the big quantities of corruption required to sustain the large scale of
underground operations. As a result, increases to already high tax rates yield only modest
expansions of the rms uno¢ cial activity, and these are more than o¤set by contractions
of its o¢ cial output. Hence the rms total output declines. At lower initial tax rates,
however, the rms aggregate output may well increase due to increases of prot taxation
because the tax-induced expansion of its uno¢ cial production exceeds the associated tax-
induced contraction of its o¢ cial production.24 The implications for international patterns
in macroeconomic performance depend on the distribution across countries of national rates
of prot tax t in relation to rm-specic levels of tax toleration t. And the implications
for government objectives in various countries  for example maximization of aggregate
o¢ cial output or perhaps even aggregate income altogether, o¢ cial plus uno¢ cial depend
on national distributions of rm-specic tax toleration in relation to the common tax rate
facing all rms in a country.25
Demand- and Supply-Side Determinants of Tax Toleration and
Compliance
Now consider how movements in tax toleration a¤ect a rms optimal production deci-
sions. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the e¤ects of changes in tax toleration originating with an
22Formally, for any t >t it can be shown that @ lnm@ ln t > 0,
@ lnC
@ ln t > 0,
@ ln yo
@ ln t < 0,
@ ln yu
@ ln t > 0 and
@ ln( yoyo+yu )
@ ln t <
0: More detailed analysis of the comparative statics appears in the Appendix of Proofs.
23Specically, @ ln(yo+yu)@ ln t < 0 if t >

+ (1  C).
24Note that results here and ahead assume rms do not internalize potential feedback from increased o¢ cial
production to higher government tax revenues, which in turn might nance lower tax rates or improved
government services beneting o¢ cial production. The impact of an individual rms production choices
on government resources is negligible and so potential feedback e¤ects rationally would be disregarded in
optimal decision making.
25This and related themes are pursued at greater length in the concluding section. Descriptive statistics
reported in section 3 indicate that within-country dispersion of tax toleration and its determinants are large.
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increase to institutional services B and with an increase to the e¤ectiveness of corruption
exposure , respectively. Recall that B is a principal determinant of the demand for corrup-
tion, whereas  is a key variable a¤ecting the supply side of the corruption market. Along
with the demand-side variable tw and the supply-side variables S and P , the availability and
quality of institutional services and the e¤ectiveness of corruption detection are potential
policy instruments that could be used by national authorities to inuence tax toleration,
and through that route tax compliance and underground production.
Figure 3 graphs how rmsprotable production possibilities shift owing to an increase
in B raising tax toleration from t0 to t1; with other outside variables held constant. The
enhancement ofB induces all rms to increase o¢ cial output (eqs. 7 and 14). Moreover, rms
initially operating to some degree uno¢ cially whose tax toleration threshold is pushed above
the prot tax rate by improvement to institutional services (rms with t0 < t <t1) will cease
producing underground. Firms already active underground whose new toleration threshold
remains below the prot tax rate (rms with t0 <t1 < t) will continue operating uno¢ cially,
but will reallocate some resources out of uno¢ cial production to o¢ cial production. Hence
both o¢ cial output yo and the share of o¢ cial output in total output
yo
yo+yu
increase with
improvements to B. And although transaction prices for corruption m will adjust downward
in response to the across-the-board decline in demand for corruption, in equilibrium both
the level and the price of corruption will be lower in the wake of the expansion among all
rms of both o¢ cial and total production.26
Figure 4 illustrates the output e¤ects of an increase in the e¤ectiveness of the corruption
exposure mechanism  that raises the rms threshold of tax toleration from t0 to t1; with
other outside variables again held constant. An increase in  contracts the supply of corrup-
tion, which induces higher o¢ cial production and lower uno¢ cial production among all rms
with initial condition t > t. By contrast to B, however,  is not a factor of production and
it therefore exerts no inuence on the output decisions of rms with initial condition t < t,
that is, among rms initially active wholly in the o¢ cial economy. In this sense the carrot
of improved institutions has wider impact than the stick of improved detection of corruption
26Formally, it can be shown that @ lnC@ lnB < 0,
@ lnm
@ lnB < 0,
@ ln yu
@ lnB < 0,
@ ln yo
@ lnB > 0,
@ ln(yo+yu)
@ lnB > 0 and
.
@ ln( yoyo+yu )
@ lnB > 0: Changes to tw yield the same pattern of e¤ects but with opposite signs.
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Figure 3: Output E¤ects of an Improvement to Institutional Benets B. An increase
in B raises a rms threshold of tax toleration from t0 to t1. Optimal production decisions under
t1 are shown by the black graph lines and under t0 by the grey graph lines. At any given tax rate
t; the rise in t prompts the rm to produce more o¢ cial output yo; and less uno¢ cial output yu.
The increase of yo always exceeds the decrease of yu, and so total output ytotal rises along with the
o¢ cial output share yo=(yo + yu).
because the former a¤ects the behavior of all rms.
Moreover, unlike the case of improvements to institutional benets which always raise
total as well as o¢ cial production, improved detection of corruption does not yield higher
total output because the ensuing decline of the rms uno¢ cial output exceeds the growth
of its o¢ cial output. Intuitively, the explanation of this result may be described by the
following sequence of events. The heightened probability of being caught and punished for
selling corruption brought about by an increase to  leads income-maximizing enforcement
bureaucrats to require higher unit prices m to supply given quantities of corruption. More
expensive corruption reduces rmsdemand for inputs of C necessary to produce uno¢ cially
without a¤ecting the marginal products of inputs to o¢ cial production. With lower uno¢ cial
production and higher exposure probability, the quantity of corruption decreases and its
price increases. In the new environment rms will tend to transfer some of their resources
to o¢ cial production, but only to the extent that additional o¢ cial prots compensate
for the uno¢ cial prots forgone due to higher costs of corruption. Firms that in the rst
instance were evading taxes will sometimes even nd it protable to exit the underground
economy completely (rms with t0 < t <t1). Yet like rms that remain to some degree in
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the underground economy under t1, the expansion of o¢ cial production among exiting rms
will not fully compensate for loss of uno¢ cial output. Consequently, among rms initially
located in the range t > t; increases to  yield rises in the o¢ cial share of output but declines
in aggregate output.27
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ytotal
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Figure 4: Output E¤ects of an Increase in Corruption Exposure E¤ectiveness :
An increase in  raises a rms threshold of tax toleration from t0 to t1. Optimal production
decisions under t1 are shown by the black graph lines and under t0 by the grey graph lines. The
increase of tax toleration induced by higher  prompts less uno¢ cial and more o¢ cial production
among rms with t > t. However the decline of yu is bigger than the rise of yo; and so although
the o¢ cial output share yo=(yo + yu) rises, total output ytotal falls. Production choices of rms
with t < t are not a¤ected by changes in .
Some Empirical Evidence
From late 1999 to mid-2000 the World Bank sponsored interviews with managers of more
than 10,000 enterprises in 80 countries covering the main regions of the world The World
27More precisely, as shown in the Appendix of Proofs, even though an increase in  has positive e¤ect on a
tax evading rms o¢ cial production, @ ln yo@ ln > 0; and on its o¢ cial share of total production,
@ ln( yoyo+yu )
@ ln > 0,
the e¤ect on its total output is negative, @ ln(yo+yu)@ ln < 0: The e¤ects of changes in S and P are qualitatively
the same.
As noted earlier, institutional benets B and e¤ectiveness of corruption exposure  will generally be
imperfectly correlated positively because both reect an underlying generic capacity of the state. Hence the
opposite responses of total output to shifts in B and  depicted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively, will to
some degree be o¤setting if both variables move at once; nonetheless it is illuminating to understand the
partial-conditional e¤ects of those distinct channels of inuence.
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Business Environment Surveys (WBES 2000).28 The interviews dealt, among other things,
with managers perceptions of the operational di¢ culties posed by taxation, government
regulations, corruption of public o¢ cials, functioning of the judiciary, and access to nancial
services. The surveys also obtained reports about the degree of tax compliance among
rms. The WBES data make possible rough empirical tests of key implications of the model
concerning (i) some direct determinants of rm-level toleration of taxation, and (ii) direct
and indirect determinants of the share of total output declared o¢ cially and subjected to
tax among rms.
Empirical analyses were undertaken for a subset of the enterprises sampled. First, because
the model pertains to the behavior of private rms, the public sector rms surveyed are
excluded. Second, enterprises in African countries are excluded because in that region the
data were obtained predominately from mail surveys, rather than from in-person interviews
which were undertaken everywhere else. Postal survey data are far less reliable than the
personal interview data.29 Finally, the usable sample was reduced further due to missing
data for one or more variables in the multivariate analyses. Sample attrition from this source
included all Middle Eastern countries. All tolled, the regression analyses ahead are based on
a common sample of personal interview responses from managers of 3686 rms distributed
over 55 countries.
Tax Toleration
A central message of the model is that a rms propensity to produce o¢ cially and pay
taxes is driven by the gap between its tax toleration t and tax rate t. Let i be an index
for rms and j an index for countries. Because the prot tax rate subsumes conventional
country-level rates tFj , and regulations on o¢ cial activity which generally impact individual
rms in di¤erent ways RFij, prot tax rates are rm-specic: tij = t
 
tFj ; R
F
ij

. Similarly,
because the labor tax rate subsumes conventional national payroll rates tLj , and labor reg-
28The raw WBES 2000 data and documentation are available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes. The WBES 2000 raw data, external data
on labor and corporate tax rates, as well as precise specications of procedures generating working variables
from the raw data and of all statistical results in this article are contained in Stata 9.2 do and dta les
posted at www.douglas-hibbs.com.
29Among other problems, the African postal surveys yielded very low response rates and implausibly low
reports of tax evasion hardly surprising in view of the fact that respondents were asked to commit reports
of illegal behavior to writing.
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ulations RLij which generally a¤ect rms in di¤erent ways, labor tax rates are rm-specic:
twij = tw
 
tLj ; R
L
ij

.
The expression dening tij in (13) indicates that tax toleration is a¤ected negatively
by payroll tax rates twij which determine the relative wage costs in o¢ cial as compared
to uno¢ cial production and vary over rms in every country, and is a¤ected positively by
institutional benets Bij which likewise vary over rms in every country. Tax toleration
is also positively a¤ected by two variables that we could not measure: total wage costs in
uno¢ cial production wij, and corruption price minima mij = ij (Sj + Pj) which vary over
rms (owing to rm-specic visibility e¤ects embodied in the detection parameter ij) in
various countries (owing to national salary levels Sj and malfeasance penalties Pj). However
some of the positive e¤ects of wij and ij (Sj + Pj) on tij will be picked up by the size
of rmscapital stock Kij, a variable that is well measured by the WBES. Kij positively
a¤ects tax toleration by increasing the visibility of corruption and its exposure ij; which in
turn raises corruption price minima mij. Kij also will tend to raise wages wij via so-called
e¢ ciency wage policies associated with large, capital rich rms. Through those indirect
channels Kij will exert positive e¤ect on tax toleration. But the direct e¤ect of Kij on tij
in (13) is negative.30 Consequently the net e¤ect of a rms capital stock on tax toleration
is ambiguous. The functional relations in terms of observables are
tij = F
"
+
Bij; tw
 
tLj ;
+
RLij

;
+= 
Kij
#
(15)
where the expected sign of F 0 () appears above each term on the right-side of (15).
Tax toleration tij is measured by the following WBES question: Please judge on a four
point scale how problematic are high taxes for the operation and growth of your business
with ordered response categories 1 =major obstacle2= moderate obstacle3=minor ob-
stacleand 4 = no obstacle.31 The aim is to tap an underlying continuum running from low
30In a model of uno¢ cial production and tax evasion among rms in which capital accumulation is en-
dogenous Busato et al. 2008 obtain theoretical results implying that direct scal subsidy of capital formation
(as opposed to tax deductions for investment spending) gives rms incentive to divert resources to uno¢ cial
activity and tax evasion.
31To ease interpretation of regression results in the next section the response codes in the raw WBES
2000 questionnaire data which ran from 1=No obstacle to 4=Major obstacle were reversed in this and other
obstaclequestions discussed ahead.
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to high values of rm-specic tax toleration. A potential deciency, however, is that when
toleration is genuinely low (because taxation is in fact perceived to be a major problem),
rm managers may nonetheless reply no obstacle because they are easily able to evade
taxes by shifting operations underground, thereby conating the concept of tax toleration
with acts of tax evasion and weakening the observed connection between the two. Although
serious in principle, this fundamental source of measurement error is not likely to be quanti-
tatively important because the incidence of negligible toleration registered by the interviews
is so low: Only 9% of responses fall in the no obstacle category, whereas as fully 58% of
rm managers regarded taxes as a major obstaclewith another 22% perceiving taxes as a
moderate obstacle.32
Institutional services Bij are measured by the WBES question Please judge on a four
point scale how problematic are these di¤erent regulatory areas for the operation and growth of
your business for items pertaining to access to nancial services, functioning of the judicial
system, and customs procedures. The response options for each item are again scaled 1 =
major obstacleto 4 = no obstacle. A composite index of Bij was constructed by taking the
arithmetic average of the scale values across the three items, yielding ten exclusive ordinal
categories running from 1 to 4 by increments of 1/3.
A composite measure of regulations on o¢ cial activity imposing burdens on o¢ cial pro-
ducers RFij, which are analogous to conventional prot taxes, was constructed in the same
way as Bij by averaging the four point scale responses to how problematic are questions
dealing with business licensing, environmental regulations, re and safety regulations, and
foreign exchange regulations. The resulting composite variable for RFij had thirteen exclusive
categories running from 1 to 4 by increments of 1/4. Labor regulations a¤ecting o¢ cially
employed labor RLij, which are akin to conventional payroll taxes, were measured by four
point scale responses to the same question regarding perceptions of problems created by
government labor regulations.
Capital assets of rms Kij are measured by the WBES question asking managers to
32The percentage frequency distribution for t in the sample of 3686 rms is:
1=major 2=moderate 3=minor 4=no(ne)
58% 22% 11% 9%
.
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estimate [the value of] your rms xed assets  land, buildings, equipment. Common
responses in the country surveys fall into ten categories ranging from less than 250,000 USD
to 500,000,000 USD or more. Though truncated at the upper end, these data supply good
calibration of physical capital stocks.
The WBES data provide no defensible empirical measure of mij = ij (Sj + Pj) the
minimum price of corruption necessary to induce enforcement o¢ cials to overlook uno¢ cial
production and tax evasion among rms in various countries or for other combinations
of ij; Sj; and Pj that a¤ect equilibrium corruption prices and production decisions. As
noted earlier, some corruption price e¤ects will be picked up by Kij because the visibility
and exposure of corrupt transactions are likely to increase with rm size.
Measurement of remaining variables in (15) is more straightforward. The corporate tax
rate tFj is measured by the top marginal tax rate on corporate prots in each country for year
2000,33 and the payroll tax rate tLj is measured by social security contribution rates for year
1999.34 Descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that among variables varying by i and
j, within-country standard deviations are 1.4 to 2.0 times the magnitude of between-country
standard deviations, implying that rm-specic characteristics a¤ecting those variables are
generally much more dispersed than country-specic attributes.
Tax Compliance and the O¢ cial Share of Production
The WBES data also allow empirical tests of the models implications concerning deter-
minants of tax compliance as registered by the share of output declared o¢ cially and subject
to tax. Figures 2-4 and the associated theoretical analyses implied that the share of taxed,
o¢ cial output in total output

yo
yo+yu

ij
is negatively related to the gap between tax rates
tij and levels of tax toleration tij, where tij is in turn a function of the outside variables on
the right-side of (15). The measurement metrics of tij and tij are incompatible, so direct
computation of tax gaps is infeasible. The model nonetheless implies the following pattern
33Data are from the World Tax Database maintained by the Ross School of Business at the University
of Michigan and are available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm. Measurement of
e¤ective rather than top rates might have been better suited to the analysis but relevant data are not
available.
34Contributions pertaining to old age, disability and death, sickness and maternity, work injury, and
unemployment were summed. The data mix contributions from employers and employees in the various
payroll systems. The constituent data are from Social Security Programs Throughout the World available
from the US Social Security administration.
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of empirical relations:35"
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(16)
Tax compliance as revealed by the o¢ cial share of total output

yo
yo+yu

ij
is measured
by responses to the WBES question Recognizing the di¢ culties many enterprises face in
fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate
the typical rm in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?36 The response options
common to all countries in the analysis fall into seven categories with irregular intervals
ranging from <50%sales reported up to 100%sales reported. 37 Descriptive statistics
in Table 1, computed from mid-point values of the seven % sales reportedcategories, show
that the standard deviation around the mean value of 78% is more than 1.4 times higher
within countries than between them a pattern similar to the dispersions of other variables
varying across rms and countries. Since all rms sampled were legally registered, it appears
that simultaneous activity in the o¢ cial and uno¢ cial economy is a quite common state
of a¤airs, a result consistent with a central feature of the theoretical model developed in
previous sections.
35The expected signs of the analogous-to-tax, regulation variables RLij and R
F
ij are opposite to those of
the conventional tax variables tLj and t
F
j because responses are coded 1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle,
implying that regulatory costs decline with higher code values.
36The WBES naturally did not ask managers directly to acknowledge criminal behavior, and for this reason
the tax evasion question was phrased with reference to the typical rm in your area of activity. Such
questions are commonly interpreted as revealing rmsown-behavior; see for example Johnson et al. 2000,
Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone 2003 and Svensson 2003. Nonetheless, the underlying behavior of interest is
necessarily measured imprecisely.
37The percentage frequency distribution for the seven response categories in the sample of 3686 rms is:
1=<50% 2=50-59% 3=60-69% 4=70-79% 5=80-89% 6=90-99% 7=100%
16% 7% 5% 8% 11% 12% 41%
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Analysis Level Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Tax Toleration, tij Firms (3686) overall 1.7 0.98 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle Countries (55) between 0.47
to 4=No Obstacle) within 0.87
Institutional Services, Bij Firms (3686) overall 2.6 0.73 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle to Countries (55) between 0.37
4=No Obstacle) within 0.65
Labour Regulations, RLij Firms (3686) overall 2.8 1.1 1 4
(1=Major Obstacle to Countries (55) between 0.57
4=No Obstacle) within 0.93
Regulations on O¢ cial Firms (3686) overall 3.0 0.72 1 4
Activity, RFij Countries (55) between 0.32
(1=Major Obstacle to within 0.65
4=No Obstacle)
Capital Assets, Kij Firms (3686) overall 108,595 197,376 125 500,000
(1000s USD) Countries (55) between 117,204
within 165,938
Tax Compliance, yo
yo+yu ij
Firms (3686) overall 79 27 25 100
mid-point values for 7 Countries (55) between 16
categories of % Sales Reported within 23
(25% to 100%)
% Corporate Tax Rate, tFj Countries (55) overall 30 6.3 15 45
% Payroll Tax Rate, tLj Countries (55) overall 28 13 4.2 53
Notes: Index i denotes rms and j denotes countries. Statistics for % Sales Reported are computed
from mid-point values but ordinal categories 1 to 7 are used as the dependent variable in the ordered
logit regressions in Table 2. Mean/variance statistics for the ordinal response variables should be
interpreted with caution even though Wald and likelihood ratio tests support treating log values
as interval independent variables in the ordered logit regressions in Table 2.
Regression Analyses
Table 2 reports three ordered logit regressions implied by the testable implications of
the theoretical model. With one exception (Institutional Services in the rst regression),
independent variables are specied in logarithms. Coe¢ cient estimates therefore represent
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e¤ects of proportional movements in each independent variable on the probabilities of various
categorical responses implied by the ordered logit estimator. Those specications implicitly
assume that the ordinal independent variables can be treated as interval an assumption
supported by standard Wald and likelihood ratio tests showing that inclusion of a separate
dummy indicator variable for each linearly independent ordinal category adds no explanatory
power to what is delivered by the single (interval) log-variable specications.38
Model (1) pertains to the determinants of Tax Toleration tij summarized by equation (15)
and the top left part of (16). All determinants of tij in the regression are highly signicant
statistically and have signs consistent with the underlying theoretical model,39 apart from log
Payroll Tax Rate which is correctly signed but has a p-value of only 0:2. More important, the
substantive e¤ects implied by the ordered logit regression coe¢ cients are large. Institutional
Services B exerts the biggest inuence on Tax Toleration. B is also the only independent
variable in Table 2 requiring ordinal representation by dummy indicator variables for response
categories. Recall that B scale values range over ten ordered categories spanning 1 to 4 by
increments of 1/3. Coe¢ cients of the indicator dummies increase monotonically with the
scale values but to conserve space only estimates for the lowest B = 1:33 and highest B = 4:0
scale categories are reported in Table 2. (B = 1 is the omitted category. It includes 2% of
the 3686 cases and its e¤ect is absorbed by the logit cut-point constants.)
To gauge magnitudes, consider a maximal improvement to the Institutional Services
index from B = 1 to B = 4 holding other variables constant at their means. Computations
using estimates for Model (1) indicate this enhancement to B would lower the probabilities a
representative rm would perceive taxes as a major obstacle (t = 1) by 0:55 or as a moderate
38Linearly independentmeans that in the presence of an intervalvariable (whether it be in log or non-
log form only a¤ects parameter scales) and the cutpoint constants of the ordered logit estimator one includes
in test regressions N-2 category dummies, where N is the total number of a variables ordinal categories.
Testing setups are described by Long, and Freese 2006 chapter 9.1.
Regressions based in the form of those reported in Table 2 with independent variables expressed in non-log
metrics yield the same pattern of results, but log variable specications yield somewhat better chi square
signicance statistics for the models entertained. A parallel set of regressions including (additive) xed
sectoral e¤ects was also undertaken to take account of the possibility of correlated errors across rms within
a sector (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, services and other). Point estimates and signicance
levels from those regressions were nearly identical to those reported in Table 2. The various test results
comprise many big tables and can be generated by running Stata les posted at www.douglas-hibbs.com.
39Recall, however, that the model did not make an unambiguous prediction for the sign of a rms capital
stock, Kij . The signicant positive coe¢ cient implies that the indirect e¤ects of Kij dominate the direct
e¤ects, but this cannot be taken as evidence one way or the other of the models validity.
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obstacle (t = 2) by 0:06, while raising the probabilities of taxes being viewed as a minor
obstacle or no obstacle at all (t = 3; 4) by 0:14 and 0:46 respectively. Those are big tax
toleration e¤ects.
The impact of shifts in log Labor Regulations are less dramatic, yet also sizeable. A
maximal shift (from the perception that labor regulations are amajor obstacle to no obstacle)
decreases the probability that taxes would be regarded as a major obstacle by 0:25; and
increases the probabilities of responses in the moderate, minor and no obstacle categories
by 0:11; 0:08 and 0:06 respectively. The impact of increases to a rms log Capital Assets
are on balance positive but much weaker than other independent variables, perhaps because
the direct and indirect e¤ects already described tend to o¤set one another. Computations
show that in order for an increase in lnK to have as much e¤ect on Tax Toleration as the
shift in lnRL discussed above, a typical rm would have to experience a sea change in its
capital endowment from next to nothing all the way up to the measured maximum of a
half billion US dollars.
Regression Models (2) and (3) investigate the determinants of Tax Compliance yo
yo+yu
as measured by the WBES interview data on % Sales Reported to tax authorities. Model
(2) is the reduced form of the causal relations sketched in equation (16). Model (3) is
the structural form. In both models independent variables are interacted with a binary
variable LT identifying rms whose managers to some degree perceive taxes as problematic
for business operations: LT = 1 when t = 1; 2 or 3 (taxes pose major, moderate or
minor obstacles); LT = 0 when t = 4 (taxes pose no obstacle). The latter rms, which
comprise 9% of the sample, are the ones depicted in Figure 2 as located to the left of t.
The theoretical model implies that among those rms Tax Compliance is not a¤ected by the
relative magnitudes of log Corporate Tax Rates and log Tax Toleration in structural form
(Model 3), or by the relative magnitudes of ln tF and the determinants of ln t in reduced
form (Model 2).40 Test statistics reported in the bottom part of Table 2 demonstrate that
the restrictions to the ordered logit regressions imposed by the LT interactions namely
F 0() = 0 at t = 4 cannot be rejected with any condence.
40Tax Compliance among the 9% of rms with LT = 0 (t = 4) is given statistically by the cut-point
constants of the ordered logistic models.
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Estimation of the reduced form ordered logit model for Tax Compliance yields highly
signicant and substantively big e¤ects for log Institutional Services and log Corporate Tax
Rates, small and signicant e¤ects for log Capital Assets,41 and insignicant e¤ects for
the Regulations and Payroll Tax Rate variables lnRL, lnRF and ln tL. As was true for
Tax Toleration, perceived usefulness of Institutional Services exerts great inuence on Tax
Compliance. For example, a maximal improvement to lnB with other variables held at
mean values, decreases the probability a typical rms Tax Compliance would fall in the
bottom category (0-50% Sales Reported) by 0:40, whilst increasing the probability of full
Tax Compliance (100% Sales Reported) by 0:46. A maximal increase in ln tF (from log 15%
to log 45.5%) also has big e¤ects. Computations show that an escalation of Corporate Tax
Rates of this magnitude lowers the probability of full Tax Compliance by around 0:62, and
raises the probability of all other categories, with much of the shift (0:23 probability points)
heaped at the bottom 0 to 50% range of Tax Compliance.
The theoretical structure summarized in equation (16) asserts that a rms threshold of
tax toleration encapsulates the e¤ects of the institutional environment and other reduced
form independent variables on a rms incentive to remain in the o¢ cial taxed economy,
as opposed to operating underground. Model (3) estimates that structure directly with
a ordered logit regression of Tax Compliance on ln t, ln tF and lnRF alone. The results
strongly support the prediction that increases to log Tax Toleration positively a¤ect Tax
Compliance thereby o¤setting at least to some degree the negative e¤ects on Compliance
exerted by Corporate Taxes and Regulations. Taken together, the empirical results are
broadly supportive of the underlying theory about how quality of governance a¤ects the
propensity of prot maximizing rms to remain in the o¢ cial taxed economy, as opposed
to evading taxes and producing underground. Indeed the correspondence of theory and
evidence appears particularly strong in view of the noisy, interview-based measurements of
the models key variables.
41As before, the results for lnK say little about the applicability of the model to the data because the
direct negative and indirect positive e¤ects of capital endowments on a rms incentive to produce o¢ cially
may tend to o¤set one another.
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Table 2
Regressions
Dependent Variables: Tax Toleration Tax Compliance
tij (1=Major Obstacle to
yo
yo+yu ij
(1= <50%, 2=50-59%,
4=No Obstacle) 3=60-69% ... 7=100%)
Model: (1) (2) (3)
structural form reduced form structural form
Institutional Services, ln(Bij+1) 1.45
(0.263j0.000)
category 2, Bij= 1:33 0.879
(0.388j0.0229)
category 10, Bij= 4:0 2.88
(0.482j0.000)
Payroll Tax Rate, -0.259 0.0113
ln(tLj +1) (0.201j0.197) (0.206j0.956)
Labor Regulations, 1.20 -0.225
ln(RLij+1) (0.308j0.000) (0.132j0.0888)
Corporate Tax Rate, -0.822 -0.574
ln(tFj +1) (0.204j0.000) (0.150j0.000)
Regulations on O¢ cial -0.0675 0.549
Activity, ln(RFij+1) (0.279j0.809) (0.262j0.0358)
Capital Assets, 0.111 0.0861
lnKij (0.028j0.000) (0.0191j0.000)
Tax Toleration, 0.733
ln(tij+1) (0.203j.000)
Wald tests support interval yes yes yes
assumptions for ordinal variables
Wald 2jp-value to reject NA 8.13j0.229 2.14j0.544
restriction F 0() = 0 at t= 4
Overall Model Wald 2jp-value 159j0.000 61.8j0.000 19.2j0.000
N FirmsjN Countries 3686j55 3686j55 3686j55
Notes: Estimation method is ordered logit with robust standard errors (clustered by country). In
parentheses (standard errorjp-value). Index i denotes rms and j denotes countries. In models
(2) and (3) independent variables are interacted with a lower tax tolerancedummy variable LT ,
where LT = 0 if t= 4 (taxes pose no obstacle), else LT = 1. Recall that RLij and R
F
ij are scored
1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle and are therefore expected to have signs opposite to those of
the associated conventional tax rate variables tLj and t
F
j :
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Concluding Observations
The central implication of theoretical and empirical results in this paper is that markets for
corruption arise and big migrations out of legal production into the underground economy
occur when large numbers of rms perceive taxes as not worth payingan unfortunate
circumstance that was summarized in terms of prot taxes imposed on producers in the
o¢ cial economy relative to rmsthresholds of tax toleration. Tax toleration is driven by
rm-specic appraisals of the availability, quality and usefulness of government services sup-
porting o¢ cial activities, by taxes and regulations on o¢ cially employed labor, by the com-
pensation of enforcement authorities, and by the e¤ectiveness of detection and punishment
of bureaucratic malfeasance. Because most of those determinants di¤er across rms, tax
toleration and tax compliance vary among producers facing the same rates of conventional
prot taxation and operating in the same national political-institutional environment.
Firms without much intrinsic need of government institutional services will likely always
be tempted to produce uno¢ cially and evade taxation unless tax rates are negligible or
corruption prices are extremely high. The latter would tend to be the case when enforcement
authorities are handsomely compensated, when they stand high chances of being caught
selling corruption, and when they are stringently penalized for any malfeasance discovered.
Though government policy clearly can a¤ect such supply-of-corruption variables, it can do
little to inuence the appetite for tax evasion among rms that inherently have little or
no interest in o¢ cial institutional services, no matter how well tuned and accessible those
services might be. Yet such rms are likely to be small (and in many cases single-person
operations, like the home cleaning help engaged uno¢ cially by many readers of this article)
and at the margins of many economies.
Most big players in an economy potentially take great productive benet of formal in-
stitutional services, and their propensity to remain in the o¢ cial, tax-paying economy can
therefore be inuenced by government e¤orts to build and sustain institutions of quality.
Firms with substantial intrinsic need of services will tend to develop high tax toleration,
if appropriate institutions are in place. Government scal policy is then less constrained 
with high tax toleration, relatively high taxes on o¢ cial productive activity may be imposed
without great fear of inducing a mass exodus of tax-paying producers into the black economy.
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Heterogeneity of tax toleration among rms has implications for the aggregate e¤ects of
policies targeted on the scale of the shadow economy and tax evasion. Depending on how
many and to what extent rms within a country have incentive to produce underground
and evade taxation, policies regarding prot taxation and the employment conditions of
enforcement bureaucrats may create trade-o¤s between containment of tax evasion and the
overall level of economic activity. For instance, strengthening incentives of enforcement
o¢ cials to remain honest reduces bureaucratic corruption and uno¢ cial economic activity
at the cost of depressing total output among evading rms, without a¤ecting the productive
activity of non-evading rms. If the economy is dominated by rms with low thresholds of
tax toleration, then higher bureaucratic salaries and better corruption detection mechanisms
may yield only modest expansions of o¢ cial production and contractions of total output.
Casual observation of the situation in many developing countries, and some developed ones
too, suggests that stamping out uno¢ cial economic activity would on the whole depress
aggregate income and economic wellbeing.
The likely e¤ects of policies addressing tax evasion by lowering prot tax rates are more
ambiguous. In developing countries, where many rms are likely to be small and heavily
involved in the uno¢ cial activity, reduction of prot tax rates will help reduce underground
production, raise tax compliance and increase national output. Prot taxation policy, how-
ever, exerts less impact in countries where many rms operate on the border of their tax
tolerance, in the sense that their tax toleration threshold is lower than but close to the
statutory tax rate. In such cases the rst-order e¤ects of reductions to prot tax rates would
tend to shrink aggregate income.
Yet the model implies that a trade-o¤ of a smaller underground economy at the cost
of lower aggregate output does not arise with policies that a¤ect institutional services and
taxes and regulations on o¢ cially employed labor. Such policies inuence all rms in the
economy because they a¤ect the productivity and protability of factors deployed in o¢ cial
production. Government supported institutions directly beneting production, for example,
have the advantage of giving tax-evading rms incentive to reduce their uno¢ cial operations,
while also inducing higher levels of output among all rms in the economy, regardless of their
location on the continuum of tax compliance. This theoretical implication may help explain
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the strong positive correlation between indicators of institutional quality and estimated levels
of total and o¢ cial aggregate national output reported in many macro-level empirical studies.
Our rm-level analysis rightly treated institutional benets and taxes as unconnected
outside variables because any particular rm would correctly perceive a choice to evade taxes
and regulations by producing uno¢ cially as having negligible impact on the governments
resources and its capacity to deliver services from which the rm might prot. However
in the macro political economy those variables are intimately connected, if only because
public institutions of high quality require commensurately large investments of public revenue
raised by taxation.42 In principle a virtuous circle is possible in which high taxes and high
tax compliance coexist amicably because important producers are anchored rmly in the
o¢ cial economy, supplying the tax revenues required to build and sustain well functioning
institutions that underpin high toleration of taxation.
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